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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Division of Separate Real Property in Divorce Action:
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer
Virginia Eggemeyer filed for divorce from Homer Eggemeyer, seeking
custody of the children, a decree of child support payments, and a division
of the property. The district court granted the divorce, named plaintiff
managing conservator of the children, and, pursuant to the Texas Family
Code,' decreed a property division which in part divested the defendant of
his title to separate real property.2 The court of civil appeals reversed the
district court's judgment insofar as it divested defendant of his title to
separate real property, holding that section 3.63 of the Family Code did not
authorize the trial court to divest a party of separate real property in a
divorce action.' On defendant's appeal the case came before the Texas
Supreme Court. Held, affirmed: A court cannot divest a person of title to his
separate real property in a divorce action under section 3.63 of the Texas
Family Code. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The predecessor statute to the current Family Code section 3.63 on
division of marital property was article 4638 of the Texas Civil Statutes.
This statute provided for the division of the estate of the parties in a divorce
action in a manner which the court considered just and right, and provided
additionally that the statute not be construed to compel the divestiture of
title to real estate on the part of either party.' The majority of cases decided
under this statute held that separate personal property of one spouse could
be set aside to the other spouse where the court deemed it necessary for a
just division of the marital property.6 The courts did acknowledge, however,
that the purpose of the statute was to restore separate property to its
respective owners and divide the community property as the court deemed
just and right.7 As noted by the court of civil appeals in Fuhrman v.
1. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975). The section pertaining to division of
property in a divorce action reads: "In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a
division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due
regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage."
2. Defendant owned an undivided one-third interest in the family farm held as separate
property, the remaining two-thirds interest being community property. The trial court divested
defendant of his title to the separate property interest.
3. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 535 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976).
4. Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony, §§ 1-14, at 19-22, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483-86 (1898).
5. Id. Article 4638 read: "The court pronouncing a decree of divorce shall also decree and
order a division of the estate of the parties in such a way as the court shall deem just and right,
having due regard to the rights of each party and their children, if any. Nothing herein shall be
construed to compel either party to divest himself or herself of the title to real estate. " TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4638 (Vernon 1960) (emphasis added).
6. Keene v. Keene, 445 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1%9, writ dism'd); Goldberg
v. Goldberg, 392 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1965, no writ); Grant v. Grant, 351
S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ dism'd); Piro v. Piro, 349 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1961, no writ); Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 302 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1957, writ dism'd).
7. See, e.g., Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 302 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1957, writ
dism'd). The court stated:
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Fuhrman,8 divestiture of separate personal property was ordered when one
spouse was without means of support or had children to support. In the
absence of such an inequity, courts rarely ordered the divestiture of sepa-
rate personal property.9 Although separate personal property was often
divested pursuant to the court's discretion, most courts refused to divest
separate real property under article 4638.10 Nevertheless, some courts which
did not allow divestiture of separate real property did set aside such proper-
ty for the support of the other spouse or the children." Indeed, not all courts
interpreted article 4638 as prohibiting the divestiture of separate realty.'
2
The provision on nondivestiture of real property had caused confusion
over whether the restriction applied only to separate real property or also to
community real property. This question was resolved in 1960, however,
when the Texas Supreme Court held in Hailey v. Hailey'3 that the nondives-
titure provision of article 4638 applied only to separate property, and not to
community property.' 4 The repeal of article 4638 and the enactment of
section 3.63 of the Family Code in 1970, which removed the divestiture
provision, revived the dispute as to whether a court may divest title to
separate real property.
Since the enactment of the marital property provisions of the Family Code
the courts have recited their broad discretion in dividing the estate of parties
to a divorce, and have asserted this power to set aside separate personal
property of either spouse in a property division decree. 5 Although claiming
the right and the power, some courts have refused to divest separate person-
al property based upon the facts of the particular case.' 6 Nevertheless, a few
In construing this statute [article 4638] it has been held that the most obvious
construction of the statute is that the separate property should be restored to its
owners, respectively, and that such division of the community be made as may
seem just and right . . . . Of course, it has been many times held that when
circumstances require it, the trial court may set aside separate property of one
party to the divorce, to the other, especially where one party is without means
of support or has children to support ....
Id. at 213.
8. 302 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1957, writ dism'd).
9. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 423 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, no writ); Beeler v.
Beeler, 363 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ dism'd).
10. See, e.g., Bohn v. Bohn, 420 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 455 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1970); Pevehouse
v. Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1957, writ dism'd).
II. Scott v. Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 123 S.W.2d 306 (1939) (trust decreed upon the separate estate
of husband for benefit of wife); Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21 (1923) (homestead
interest in land, which was the separate property of husband, awarded to wife and children for
their support during wife's life). Provision for the support of children was codified by TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 (Vernon 1975).
12. Farrell v. Farrell, 407 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's award to the husband of title to the wife's
separate real property, asserting that the district court had jurisdiction and a duty to adjudicate
title to property in such a manner. Id. at 849.
13. 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 299 (1960).
14. Id. at 376, 331 S.W.2d at 303. See also Reardon v. Reardon, 163 Tex. 605, 359 S.W.2d
329 (1962); Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ); Harrison v.
Harrison, 365 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ dism'd).
15. See, e.g., In re Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ dism'd);
Burns v. Burns, 541 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ dism'd); Dietz v.
Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
16. See, e.g., Dietz v. Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ). The
court in Dietz refused to award benefits from the separate estate of the husband to the wife,
even though the property division was vastly disparate in value. The court supported its refusal
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recent decisions under section 3.63 have purported to grant divestiture of
separate real property;17 two additional cases, although not speaking directly
to the issue of separate real property, have indicated the wide extent of the
court's power to invade the separate property of one spouse for the benefit
of the other spouse when justice dictates."8 This inconsistency of decision
and interpretation among the several Texas courts of civil appeals prompted
the Texas Supreme Court to hear the case of Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer.
II. EGGEMEYER V. EGGEMEYER
The issue before the Supreme Court in Eggemeyer was whether section
3.63 of the Texas Family Code permits the court to divest one spouse of his
or her title to separate real property in a divorce property division decree. In
a five-to-four decision, the court held that section 3.63 of the Code did not
authorize such divestiture and supported its decision with five basic argu-
ments. In affirming the decision of the court of civil appeals, however, the
Supreme Court misquoted the holding of that court as stating, "section 3.63
of the Family Code does not authorize such a divestiture of one's title to
separate property.' 9 The appeals court had limited its holding to nondives-
titure of separate real property, and this misquotation has added to the
confusion in interpreting the decision.
The court first explored the intention of the legislature in enacting section
3.63, and concluded that the legislature intended to codify then-existing
law.20 Because the law at that time specifically included a provision prohibit-
ing divestiture of title to realty on the part of either spouse,2 the court
argued that this provision of article 4638 was intended by the legislature to
be utilized in the interpretation of section 3.63 of the Code.
Secondly, the court looked to section 14.05 of the Code,22 which au-
thorizes the court to "set aside" property of a parent to be administered for
the support of a child under eighteen years of age.2 3 The court emphasized
on the grounds that the marriage was of short duration, each party was capable of providing his
or her own support, and there were no minor children. Id. at 420.
17. See, e.g., Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ) (court
awarded real property claimed by husband as his separate property to wife in property division
decree, holding that it need not decide the separate property issue since the court was given
wide latitude in dividing separate as well as community property); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515
S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ) (court divested wife of her equitable title to
real estate purchased partly with her separate funds).
18. Looney v. Looney, 541 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ) (court
cited its power to invade separate property of one spouse for benefit of other spouse where
necessary to do justice, but did not divest title to separate real property in view of items
awarded wife and fact that husband was ordered to pay all debts); Merrell v. Merrell, 527
S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court claimed right to divide
separate property as it deemed right and just, but did not confront issue in fact, since it claimed
evidence did not conclusively establish that duplexes in question were separate property of
husband).
19. 554 S.W.2d at 138.
20. The court cited as support for this conclusion McKnight, Commentary on Title I Texas
Family Code, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 337-42 (1974).
21. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
22. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 (Vernon 1975).
23. d. On support of children the Code states:
The court may order either or both parents to make periodic payments or a
lump-sum payment, or both, for the support of the child until he is 18 years of
age in the manner and to the person specified by the court in the decree. In
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that the property was "to be administered," rather than divested, and was to
be "for the support of the child," rather than the support of a spouse.24
Since section 3.63 does not expressly authorize the divestiture of separate
realty, and since section 14.05 does not provide for divestiture but only for
administration of a spouse's property for child support, the court concluded
that the legislature in enacting section 14.05 was codifying existing law.
In the third argument the language of section 3.63 was examined. That
section provides that a divorce decree shall contain "a division of the estate
of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right."25 The court
construed the singular tense of "estate" of the parties as applying only to
community property. 26 Thus, the separate real property could not be reach-
ed by a divorce property division decree.
The court's fourth argument involved the constitutional definition of
separate property. In Texas separate property is constitutionally defined for
a wife and legislatively defined for a husband. The Texas Constitution
defines separate property of the wife as all property owned before marriage
and acquired afterward by gift, devise, or descent. 27 The Code gives a like
definition applicable to the separate property of husband and wife. 28 The
court reasoned that if one spouse's separate property could be taken under a
divorce decree and vested as separate property in the other spouse, a type
of separate property would result which is not embraced within the constitu-
tional definition. This is at variance with the court's previous finding that the
legislature cannot transform one type of constitutionally defined property
into another type of property. 29 A construction of section 3.63 which au-
thorizes divestiture of separate property would, therefore, be inconsistent
with the constitutional definition of separate property under article XVI.
The fifth and most important reason for the court's decision was the
constitutional requirement that a taking of private property be for a public
purpose. The Texas Constitution prohibits the taking of private property
except by due course of the law of the land. 31 Interpretation of this constitu-
tional provision by the Texas Supreme Court reveals that private property
cannot be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying
public purpose even though compensation is paid.3' The taking of a hus-
band's separate property for the benefit of his wife cannot be said to have
been for a justifiable public purpose.
addition, the court may order a parent obligated to support a child to set aside
property to be administered for the support of the child in the manner and by the
persons specified by the court in the decree.
Id. (emphasis added).
24. 554 S.W.2d at 139.
25. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).
26. 554 S.W.2d at 139.
27. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
28. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975).
29. Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1966). The court held that § 46 of the
Texas Probate Code as amended in 1961 was unconstitutional. That section provided that a
husband and wife could by written agreement create a joint estate out of their community
property, with rights of survivorship. Section 46 was held unconstitutional since statutory
partition with resulting separate property was the necessary prerequisite to a written agreement
between husband and wife to create a joint estate with rights of survivorship. Id. at 508.
30. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
31. Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 305, 177 S.W.2d 941, 949 (1944).
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Although not addressed in the court's opinion, there is a further constitu-
tional issue under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 2 A statute which authorizes the taking of a
person's property for the benefit of another private person without a justify-
ing public purpose may be invalid under the United States Constitution. 33
The revised dissent by Justice Steakley raised two basic objections to the
majority's interpretation of section 3.63. First, the dissent did not agree with
the majority's statutory construction of section 3.63. Following established
principles of statutory construction, the dissent asserted that the purposeful
elimination of the prohibition against divestiture of title to realty from
section 3.63 was designed to allow such divestiture, and that the plain
meaning of the statue mandated such a result.34
Further, the dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "es-
tate of the parties," claiming their conclusion to be clearly against existing
case law which by implication was ratified by the legislature in its reenact-
ment of the statute without change in this language. The dissent pointed out
that article 4638 prohibited only divestiture of title to realty, not personalty,
and that there is no difference in the constitutional classification of separate
real and separate personal property. Since there is no longer a statutory
prohibition against divestiture of title to realty, realty should receive the
same treatment as personalty. Therefore, the dissent concluded, an award
of separate real property to the other spouse is permissible.3
Secondly, the dissent did not agree that divesting separate property of one
spouse and vesting such property in the other spouse would be unconstitu-
tional. 6 The dissent saw article XVI, section 15 as applying only to the initial
characterization of property, not to property characterization after the
divorce of the parties. Additionally, the dissent asserted that the constitu-
tional definition of separate property is not exclusive, citing post-marriage
increases in the value of separately held land37 and personalty,38 and person-
al injury awards39 as examples. 4' Personal injury awards are specifically
included as separate property under section 5.01 of the Code 4' and the
constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Graham v. Franco .42 The
dissent further argued that due process is not violated by divestiture of title
to separate realty. A public purpose is served by such a taking: to redress the
imbalance should one spouse artfully accumulate a separate estate at the
expense of the community estate, thus leaving the other spouse a depleted
community estate upon divorce. 3
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896).
34. 554 S.W.2d at 143.
35. Id. at 149.
36. Id. at 145-49; see notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
37. Evans v. Purinton, 34 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd).
38. Stringfellow v. Sorrells, 82 Tex. 277, 18 S.W. 689 (1891); Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6
(1851); Lessing v. Russek, 234 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
40. 554 S.W.2d at 148-49.
41. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon 1975).
42. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972). The result of this decision was to give a liberal interpreta-
tion to TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 15.
43. 554 S.W.2d at 148.
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The constitutional arguments presented by the majority opinion as to the
taking of private property, plus the possible fourteenth amendment" argu-
ment, present a rational framework for the basis of this decision. Divestiture
of one's separate property does raise constitutional issues which until this
time had been largely ignored.
Although the court addressed with specificity only the question of divesti-
ture of separate real property, the decision could by analogy extend to the
divestiture of separate personal property. Neither the Texas Constitution
nor the United States Constitution distinguishes between personal and real
property; each speaks only to the general term "property." Womack v.
Womack45 defined "property" as a word of comprehensive meaning, ex-
tending to every species of valuable right and interest and including both real
and personal property. The constitutional analysis used by the court could,
therefore, equally be applied to the issue of separate personal property. This
same reasoning might be further extended to prohibit an unequal distribution
of community property, since community property is by definition an equal
and vested joint ownership by husband and wife. 6 An unequal division
might be construed as a taking of private property without a corresponding
public purpose.
III. CONCLUSION
Section 3.63 of the Texas Family Code has caused much difference of
opinion among the several state courts of civil appeals on the question of
whether this statute authorizes the divestiture of separate real property in a
divorce decree. The Texas Supreme Court has finally settled this issue by
declaring that section 3.63 does not authorize such divestiture of separate
realty. Although the future of the division of separate personal property is
not clear at this time, it can be strongly argued that, in light of Eggemeyer's
reasoning section 3.63 prohibits the divestiture of separate personal proper-
ty or a spouse's fifty percent interest in the community, property. In spite of
the hope that the Eggemeyer decision would definitively set forth the types
of marital property which are susceptible of division under section 3.63 upon
a decree of divorce, this decision has raised additional issues. By not
limiting its own arguments, the majority has presented new areas of conten-
tion for future litigation.
Diane Muse
44. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
45. 141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307 (1943).
46. Rompel v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 483, 486-87 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd on other grounds,
326 U.S. 367 (1945). This case held that the wife is an equal owner, along with her husband, in
all community property, that their interests thereof are of equal dignity, and that each interest in
community property is absolute and a vested property right to which each spouse is entitled
upon divorce. Id. at 486-87. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still, 163 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1942, writ ref'd); Lusk v. Parmer, 114 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1938, writ dism'd).
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